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Introduction
One of the most controversial areas of
global health diplomacy over the past five
years has involved negotiations to increase
equitable access to vaccines for highly
pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1)
(HPAI-H5N1) and pandemic 2009 influ-
enza A (H1N1) (2009-H1N1). The limited
results produced by these negotiations
have stimulated calls for a new global
framework to improve equitable access to
influenza vaccines. The prospects for such
a framework are not, however, promising,
because the national interests of most
developed states vis-a `-vis dangerous influ-
enza strains favor retaining the existing
imbalanced, reactive, and ad hoc ap-
proach to vaccine access. This article
examines why negotiating equitable access
to influenza vaccines in the context of
HPAI-H5N1 and 2009-H1N1 has been,
and promises to continue to be, a difficult
diplomatic endeavor.
Influenza Vaccine Access
Controversies: HPAI-H5N1 and
2009-H1N1
The re-emergence of HPAI-H5N1 in
2004 and its spread triggered fears that the
world was on the brink of a potentially
devastating influenza pandemic [1]. Prep-
arations for pandemic influenza frantically
began, and included plans to develop a
vaccine for a pandemic H5N1 strain.
These plans ran headlong into develop-
ing-countryconcernsthattheir populations
would not have access to H5N1 vaccines.
These concerns, and the lack of any
mechanism to ensure equitable access to
vaccines and other benefits from research
on influenza viruses, prompted Indonesia,
in 2007, to refuse to share H5N1 virus
samples with the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) that would be used for
surveillance [2,3]. Supported by many
developing countries, Indonesia’s action
questioned the legitimacy of WHO’s Glob-
al Influenza Surveillance Network and
forced WHO and its member states to
begin negotiations to create a new system
of influenza virus and benefits sharing [4].
Although WHO member states agreed to
establish a stockpile of H5N1 vaccine [5],
the negotiations have, to date, failed to
reach agreement [6].
Concerns about equitable access flared
again in 2009 when a novel strain of
influenza A (H1N1) emerged and spread
around the world. The speed and ease
with which the 2009-H1N1 strain moved
meant that a vaccine was the only
practical means of preventing infection,
and efforts to produce a vaccine began in
the late spring and early summer [7].
Developed countries placed large advance
orders for 2009-H1N1 vaccine and bought
virtually all the vaccine companies could
manufacture [8,9]. Developing countries
and WHO identified the lack of equity in
how developed countries were securing
access to the vaccine [10]. WHO entered
talks with manufacturers and developed-
country governments to secure some
vaccine for developing countries [11],
and WHO and the United Nations (UN)
appealed for monetary donations to pur-
chase vaccines and other supplies to help
developing countries address the 2009-
H1N1 virus [12]. These efforts yielded
donation pledges from manufacturers [13]
and developed countries [14], but the
donations still left the developing world
with limited supplies [15] compared to
developed countries, which would retain,
even after donations, sufficient vaccine to
cover their populations.
Feared and actual problems with 2009-
H1N1 vaccine production, however, af-
fected the amount and timing of vaccine
available for developing countries. As of
this writing, Canada had not joined other
developed countries in pledging to donate
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Canada [16], and Canada awarded its
vaccine contract to a Canadian company
because it feared that foreign govern-
ments might restrict exports to Canada
because of vaccine shortages within their
territories [17]. The Australian govern-
ment made it clear to the Australian
manufacturer CSL that it must fulfill the
government’s domestic needs before ex-
porting vaccine to the United States [18].
The United States pledged on September
17, 2009, to donate 10% of its vaccine
purchases to WHO, but on October 28,
US Secretary of Health and Human
Services Kathleen Sebelius stated that
the United States would not donate
H1N1 vaccine as promised until all at-
risk Americans had access, because pro-
duction problems had created shortages
in the United States [19]. These fears and
actions reinforced the sense that the status
quo concerning equitable access to influ-
enza vaccines for developing countries
was flawed.
Moving beyond Strain-Specific
Responses: The Call for a Global
Access Framework
The unsatisfactory nature of vaccine
access concerning HPAI-H5N1 and
2009-H1N1 has created interest in crea-
tion of a global framework for equitable
access that would become operational
before the next influenza crisis. In a
presentation to the Forum of Microbial
Threats of the Institute of Medicine in
September 2009, WHO’s lead influenza
specialist, Keiji Fukuda, described the
problems experienced with the negotia-
tions on HPAI-H5N1 virus and benefits
sharing and on obtaining donations from
manufacturers and developed countries
for 2009-H1N1 vaccine [20]. Fukuda
emphasized that the process and out-
comes of the negotiations were subopti-
mal in terms of both public health and
global equity and justice. Other experts
have made similar claims concerning the
moral and social justice issues at stake in
equitable access to 2009-H1N1 vaccines
[21,22]. In the interests of global health
and global solidarity, Fukuda argued that
a framework was needed to support
global responses to influenza threats and
ensure equitable access to vaccines for
developing countries [16]. He asserted
that improving access is the central global
governance issue of our times, which gives
the need for a global access framework
importance beyond the world of public
health.
Getting to Access: Negotiating
Equitable Access to Influenza
Vaccines
Negotiations to increase access to vac-
cines for HPAI-H5N1 and 2009-H1N1
have not proved successful for many
reasons. In the Intergovernmental Meet-
ing (IGM) on Pandemic Influenza Pre-
paredness Framework for the Sharing of
Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines
and Other Benefits, WHO member states
failed to reach agreement because they
could not agree on benefit sharing [23].
Developing countries want obligatory
benefit sharing in return for virus sharing,
with binding terms spelled out in a
Standard Material Transfer Agreement
(SMTA). In contrast, developed countries
want to avoid binding obligations to
provide benefits (e.g., vaccines, antivirals)
in exchange for access to virus samples
provided by developing countries. At least
one news report indicated that developed
countries wanted to avoid losing their
ability to place advance orders for influ-
enza vaccine because of a binding SMTA
[19].
Interestingly, the 2009-H1N1 outbreak
was underway when the IGM negotiations
concluded unsuccessfully, meaning that
this latest influenza threat was not a
‘‘game changer’’ for the positions staked
out by WHO member states. In fact, the
manner in which the outbreak and vaccine
development and use proceeded favored
developed countries for two reasons. First,
countries with cases of 2009-H1N1 shared
virus samples with WHO for surveillance
and vaccine development without a quid
pro quo for benefit sharing. To date,
Indonesia remains the only country that
has refused to share virus samples; other
developing countries, even those that have
supported Indonesia, share their samples
without requiring benefits in return. Sec-
ond, developed countries were able,
through advance purchase contracts, to
access almost all the vaccine existing
manufacturing facilities can produce
[8,9] in order to ensure they would have
2009-H1N1 vaccine for their popula-
tions—precisely the option developed
countries do not want the proposed
SMTA to affect.
In terms of vaccine for 2009-H1N1,
donations from manufacturers and devel-
oped countries were not the product of
real negotiations, given that WHO and
developing countries had little leverage to
influence developed countries other than
rhetoric about equity, justice, and solidar-
ity. As experts noted, the donations from
manufacturers were initially made without
a fixed delivery date, meaning that the
donated vaccines might arrive too late to
be of much benefit in developing countries
[24]. Developed countries only agreed
to make donations after (1) they learned,
unexpectedly, that a one-dose regimen
would immunize adults, which doubled
the amount of vaccine available [25]; and
(2) data from the Northern and Southern
hemispheres revealed that the 2009-H1N1
virus was behaving as a mild virus and not
as a killer strain [15], which reduced the
threat the virus posed. In addition, devel-
oped countries pledging donations made
sure that they had enough vaccine to
cover their populations or, as happened
with the United States, postponed dona-
tions in order to address national needs.
In essence, manufacturers and developed
countries incurred minimal financial, na-
tional public health, or political costs in
pledging and, if necessary, delaying vac-
cine donations.
Vaccine and Resource Access in
International Law
What has transpired in the contexts of
HPAI-H5N1 and 2009-H1N1 reflects
patterns seen in other efforts to create
equitable access for vaccines and drugs.
Existing international legal regimes that
support global health, such as the WHO
Constitution, the ‘‘right to health’’ in
human rights treaties, and the Interna-
tional Health Regulations 2005, do not
contain specific, binding provisions on
equitable access to vaccines and drugs for
developing countries. WHO’s interest in
creating a new global framework rather
than relying on existing legal agreements
reinforces the lack of any specific equitable
access regime. Efforts to generate equita-
ble access are not operated through
purpose-built international legal instru-
ments, and these efforts include WHO’s
adoption of a nonbinding global strategy
on public health, innovation, and intellec-
tual property [26]; provision of vaccines
and drugs by intergovernmental organiza-
tions (e.g., WHO, UNICEF); bilateral
donation schemes (e.g., the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief); and
public–private and nongovernmental mech-
anisms that make vaccines and drugs
more available to developing countries
(e.g., the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria; the GAVI
Alliance; Clinton Global Initiative; Me ´de-
cins Sans Frontie `res’ Campaign for Access
to Essential Medicines; the International
Finance Facility for Immunization; UNI-
TAID; and Advance Market Commitments
for Vaccines).
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negotiations on virus and benefit sharing
in connection with HPAI-H5N1 have, to
date, failed, and why negotiations on a
global access framework in the wake of
the problems surrounding 2009-H1N1
would face obstacles. In short, states
have not agreed to binding arrangements
on more equitable access but, rather,
attempt to increase such access through
ad hoc, reactive, and nonbinding activities
that preserve national freedom of action
while demonstrating some humanitarian
concern.
Moreover, the situation concerning
access to vaccines and drugs reflects how
states generally allocate control of and
access to resources. The central principles
for allocating resources in international
law are (1) sovereignty for resources found
within a state’s territory [27], and (2)
exclusive jurisdiction or control for re-
sources found seawards from coastal states
(e.g., the Exclusive Economic Zone in the
law of the sea) [28]. International relations
provide few, if any, examples of states
establishing a global framework to allocate
resources, or the benefits derived from
their exploitation, equitably. The most
famous effort occurred in the negotiation
of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) in the 1970s and early
1980s and involved designating mineral
resources found beyond 200 nautical miles
from coastal states as the ‘‘common
heritage of mankind,’’ which would be
exploited under jurisdiction of an Interna-
tional Seabed Authority, with benefits
accruing to developing countries [29].
However, the United States and other
developed countries opposed this aspect of
UNCLOS, which, because of this opposi-
tion, has been revised to reflect what these
developed countries prefer concerning
exploitation of these mineral resources
[30].
The problems of equitable access to
vaccines and drugs reflect these larger
patterns in international law and interna-
tional relations. As Indonesia’s assertion of
‘‘viral sovereignty’’ demonstrates, states
have sovereignty over biological samples
isolated within their territories. Negotia-
tions within the WHO [5] and the IGM
[19] have re-emphasized that states have
sovereignty over biological resources
found within their jurisdictions. Similarly,
states in which vaccines and drugs are
manufactured have sovereignty over the
manufacturing process and the products
themselves, until they are exported. States
that import vaccines and drugs then have
sovereignty over such resources and,
absent a binding obligation, may allocate
them however they wish. Negotiations to
create a global access framework that
more equitably distributes influenza vac-
cines would need to navigate through
triple claims of sovereignty—a very tall
order, without even factoring in the
divergence of national interests seen in
the IGM negotiations on virus and benefit
sharing and the access problems associated
with vaccine for 2009-H1N1.
Conclusion
Increasing equitable access to vaccines
for dangerous influenza strains represents
a difficult challenge for global health
diplomacy, a challenge this article has
addressed in only a preliminary manner.
Efforts to recalibrate virus- and benefit-
sharing in connection with HPAI-H5N1
through intergovernmental negotiations
have not, so far, been successful. The
manner in which access to vaccine for
2009-H1N1 played out highlights why the
interests of developed and developing
countries diverge in this context, and the
reasons behind this divergence deserve
deeper study. Existing international legal
regimes on global health provide no
templates for negotiating the new global
access framework that WHO and others
perceive is necessary. Similarly, negotia-
tions for equitable access to resources, or
the benefits of their exploitation, have
generally failed in other areas of interna-
tional relations, dimming prospects that
precedents for a global access framework
for pandemic influenza vaccines can be
found outside the global health context.
The default rules for allocating resources
in international law rely on the principle of
sovereignty, and these rules hold in the
context of virus samples and vaccine
supplies, as demonstrated with HPAI-
H5N1 and 2009-H1N1.
Even the emergence of the first pan-
demic strain of influenza in 40 years in
2009 did not break the pattern of state
behavior with respect to equitable access
to a valuable but scarce resource. The
appearance of a more severe influenza
strain will reinforce rather than overcome
this pattern, because developed countries
will prize their power and flexibility of
action more in a severe pandemic than in
a mild one, thus making hope for a crisis-
sparked breakthrough misguided. The
negotiating path that could lead to a new
global access framework for influenza
vaccines is not apparent, especially in a
context in which aggregate global produc-
tion capacity is woefully inadequate, the
geographic location of production facilities
is concentrated in developed countries,
timelines for developing new vaccines
create problems for rapid prevention
strategies, and existing manufacturing
technologies and distribution systems re-
quire improvements.
The need to increase global production
capacity, diversify locales for manufactur-
ing facilities, decrease the time from ‘‘lab
to jab,’’ and reduce production and
distribution uncertainties, has been recog-
nized for years without sufficient progress
being made, as evidenced by the HPAI-
H5N1 and 2009-H1N1 controversies.
Further research is required on ways in
which states and non-state actors can
address these problems through negotiated
collective action. The diplomatic environ-
ment may have been made more difficult
by accusations made and hearings held by
officials in the Council of Europe that
WHO succumbed to pressure from the
pharmaceutical industry to declare a ‘‘false
pandemic’’ and support development and
use of a vaccine [31,32]. In the environ-
ment that exists on these issues, diplomatic
advances will not be made simply by
repeated claims that an undefined ‘‘global
framework’’ is required because more
equitable access is the just and moral end
all states should seek.
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